This essay deals with Aristotle's complex account in Politics
III.4 of the good man and the upright citizen. By this account the
goodness of an upright citizen is relative to the city of which he is a
citizen, whereas the goodness of a good man is absolute. Aristotle holds
that the goodness of a good man and the goodness of an upright citizen are
identical in one case only, that of a full citizen of his ideal city. In a
non-ideal city the two are always distinct. One would expect, then, that
cases would arise where the goodness of an upright citizen would demand,
and the goodness of a good man forbid, the very same action. Aristotle,
however, never discusses such cases directly, and many scholars have
thought that he skirts the issue entirely. I argue, on the contrary, that
Aristotle believes that there are cases where a good man will act
differently from an upright citizen and that, consequently, he believes,
as we would hope he would believe, that there are limits to political
obligation.